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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE OVERLAP BETWEEN
UTILITY PATENTS, PLANT PATENTS, THE PVPA,
AND TRADE SECRETS AND THE LIMITATIONS
ON THAT OVERLAP

I.

INTRODUCTION

As industries become more technologically advanced, the research
investments and capital expenditures necessary to develop and produce
products similarly increase.I To protect these financial outlays and thereby
promote future technological advancement, individuals and companies have
increasingly relied upon intellectual property rights. 2 As intellectual property rights have become increasingly important, the scope of many have
been expanded. 3 The suggestion "that a corporation's 'intellectual capital'
is its most valuable asset" helps to explain this expansion in the scope of
intellectual property rights. 4
This expansion of intellectual property rights has brought about an
increase in the amount of overlap between intellectual property rights. 5
Although the courts have at times been unwilling to allow some areas of
overlap, 6 several areas of overlap between intellectual property rights have
been identified and allowed. Existing areas of overlap are the overlap

1. Richard J. Warburg & Stephen B. Maebius, Warning: Research Dollars at Risk!,
PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. DEvICE, Apr. 22, 2003, at 1.
2. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report
Fiscal Year 2003, Other Accompanying Information, tbl. 6.4.6 (2003), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/20O3/060406_table6.html
(last visited Jan. 26,
2005) (providing that the number of patents issued per year has more than tripled over the last
twenty years, from 59,715 in 1983, to 189,597 in 2003).
3. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection:A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 371, 372, 375
(2002) (noting that patent law has been extended to computer software, non-human life forms,
business methods, as well as new varieties of plants).
4. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, § 1.02 [1] (2004); Thomas A. Stewart, Your Company's
Most Valuable Asset: Intellectual Capital,FORTUNE, October 3, 1994, at 68.
5. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 3, at 375.
6. See TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (holding that an
expired utility patent precludes a claim for trade dress protection); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 225 (1964) (holding that state unfair competition law cannot "impose liability
for or prohibit the copying of an article which is protected by neither a federal patent or
copyright").
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between: trade secrets and patents; 7 trade secrets and the Plant Variety and
Protection Act (PVPA);8 utility patents and the PVPA as well as the Plant
Patent Act; 9 trade dress and copyrights;10 and between trade dress and

design patents.lI
This note will identify and explore the areas of overlap, and attempt to
establish the existing limits on dual and multiple protection of intellectual
property. Specifically, this note will focus on the overlap between utility
patents, plant patents, the PVPA, and trade secrets. The overlap between
trade dress, copyrights, and design patents has been explored elsewhere and
will not be discussed here. 12
Part II of this note will provide the necessary background and scope of
the individual intellectual property rights. Part III will address how the
courts have dealt with the potential overlap between intellectual property
rights relating to plants. It addresses the overlap between the Plant Patent
Act, the PVPA, utility patents, as well as trade secrets, and further
demonstrates the courts' willingness to allow those areas of overlap.
Part IV will address how the courts have dealt with the overlap
between patents and trade secrets and will also illustrate precise areas of
overlap. The examination shows that, while the ability of patents and trade
secrets to coexist is certain, the extent of coexistence has not been well
defined. Furthermore, several areas of overlap are explored including information disclosed to satisfy the patent requirements of best mode and written
description.

7. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989) (stating that
"the protection offered by trade secret law may 'dovetail' with the incentives created by the
federal patent monopoly").
8. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found., 35 F.3d 1226, 1242 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the PVPA does not preempt state trade secret law as applied to sexually reproducing plants).
9. See J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001) (holding
that the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act "can be read alongside" the statutory
subject matter requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and further stating that "dual protection" is not
inconsistent with the patent policy of encouraging invention).
10. See Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action for Trade Dress Infringement under § 43(a) of
Lanham Act, 7 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 725, § 2 (2003) (stating that "there is a strong overlap
between features that may be protected under copyright law, and those protectable as trade dress,"
and collecting cases to support the contention).
11. See Traffix Devices Inc., 532 U.S. at 34 (providing dicta indicating that trade dress
protection would be allowed for "arbitrary, incidental, or ornamental aspects of features of a
product found in ... patent claims .... "); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 (stating that "[tirade
dress is, of course, potentially the subject matter of design patents.").
12. See Perry J. Saidman, Kan TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan Kopy Kats? or Beyond
Functionality:Design Patents Are the Key to Unlocking the Trade Dress/Patent Conundrum, 82 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc. 839, 853-57 (2000) (discussing the "functionality doctrine" and
how it applies to the trade dress/patent overlap); see also Robert C. Dorr & Christopher H. Munch,
Trade Dress Law, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 816, 816-17 (Sept.-Oct. 2000) (stating that the book
traces the overlap between trade dress, copyright, trademark, and design patent protection).
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Part V will discuss the existence and sufficiency of the limitations on
the previously identified areas of overlap. An examination is included of
the judicially created limitation on the plant and utility patent overlap, and
this limitation is further analogized to suggest the need for a similar
limitation on the overlap between the PVPA and patents for plants. The
inherent limitations on the overlap between patents and trade secrets, and
the PVPA and trade secrets are also explored. Finally, Part VI concludes
that the coexistence and overlap of these intellectual property rights furthers
the underlying policy of promoting invention, and that one external limitation should be provided on the overlap between patents and the PVPA.
II.

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
A.

PATENTS

The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[tlo promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."1 3 While the clause contains a grant of power, it also contains
limitations on the use of that power.14 "Congress may not create patent
monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it 'authorize the issuance of
patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.""15
Furthermore, while the exclusive right given to inventors is an
incentive to take risks by investing enormous costs, the exclusive right is
not given freely.16 A quid pro quo exists where the inventor has to provide
full disclosure of his invention in exchange for the exclusive right to
exclude others from making, using, marketing, and selling the invention. 17
This exchange benefits both the inventor and society by introducing new

13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
15. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
16. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
17. Id. Title 35 lends further support to the full disclosure requirement by providing:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from
using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the
United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the
particulars thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
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products and machines into the economy, while maintaining the inventor's
willingness to disclose.18
The United States Patent and Trademark Office grants three different
types of patents: utility patents,19 plant patents, 20 and design patents. 21 The
requirements to obtain utility patents and plant patents as well as the
protection each provides will be discussed in turn.
1.

Utility Patents

To obtain a utility patent, the invention must be new, 22 useful,23 and
non-obvious. 24 Furthermore, the invention must be of the appropriate subject matter. 25 Finally, 35 U.S.C. § 11226 sets out the minimum disclosure
requirements necessary to justify the grant of a patent. 27 Specifically, "the
patentee must disclose in the patent sufficient information to put the public
in possession of the invention and to enable those skilled in the art to make

18. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480-8 1.
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-57 (2000). Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor [sic], subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (2000). Section 161 provides:
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety
of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings,
other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may
obtain a patent therefor [sic], subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for
plants, except as otherwise provided.
35 U.S.C. § 161.
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (2000); Colleen R. Butcher, An Exploration of the Unintended
Temporal Extension of the Plant Patent Term, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 137, 139 (2003).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (providing "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new....
(emphasis added); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (providing novelty conditions that a patent must
satisfy).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (providing "[wihoever invents or discovers any new and
useful.. ") (emphasis added); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (providing "[t]he specification shall
contain a written description... to enable a person ... to make and use the [invention]")
(emphasis added).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (providing non-obviousness conditions an application must satisfy to
issue as a patent); see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 12-14, 17
(1966) (providing that nonobviousness is a requirement for patentability and setting forth four
factual inquiries to determine compliance).
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (providing that invention must be a "process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof....").
26. Hereinafter all textual references to section numbers will refer to Title 35 United States
Code.
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (setting out written description, enablement, and best mode
disclosure requirements).
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and use the invention." 28 Furthermore, "[t]he applicant must not conceal
from the public the best way of practicing the invention that was known to
the patentee at the time of filing the patent application." 29 If the patentee
does not comply with these disclosure requirements, the patent application
may be denied or an already issued patent may be invalidated. 30
Once all of these stringent requirements and several other formal
requirements 31 have been satisfied, a patentee is entitled to the exclusive
rights to the invention for a twenty-year term. 32 These exclusive rights are
not an affirmative right to make, use, or sell the invented device, but rather
they grant the "right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention." 33 Furthermore, the patentee's failure to use the invention does
not affect the validity of the patent. 34 Upon the expiration of this twenty
year term, the patent rights created cease to exist and the invention is free
for public use. 35
A utility patent may also be obtained for a plant. 36 In addition to
meeting the requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness, "the
plant must meet the specifications of Section 112, which require a written
description of the plant and a deposit of seed that is publicly accessible." 37
However, utility patents have not always been extended to cover plants. 38
2.

Plant Patents

The first patent coverage extended to plants was through the Plant
Patent Act (PPA) of 1930.39 Congress amended the law pertaining to plant

28. MAGDALEN Y. C. GREENLIEF, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF

PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2162 (2004).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (requiring payment of issue fee within three months of
allowance or the application goes abandoned); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.362 (2004) (requiring
payment of periodic maintenance fee for utility patents before expiration of grace period or the
patent will expire).
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (providing that the term begins on the date the patent
issues and expires twenty years from the filing date).
33. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.0211] (2004).

34. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1945) (citations omitted).
35. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
36. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001).
37. ld.; see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-809 (2004) (providing rules for the deposit of seed).
38. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 132 (noting that plants had not been granted any patent
protection prior to the creation of the Plant Patent Act).
39. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Plant Patent Act (35
U.S.C.S. §§ 161 et seq.), 135 A.L.R. Fed. 273 (1996).
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patents several times until the requirements to obtain a patent under the
PPA were finalized in 1954.40
The current eligibility requirements for a plant patent require that the
plant be new and distinct, asexually reproduced, and not tuber propagated
or found in an uncultivated state. 41 Furthermore, other than a few exceptions, a plant patent application must meet requirements similar to those
imposed on utility patents. 42 Under these exceptions, descriptions contained in a plant patent application must be "as complete as is reasonably
possible," no deposit of seed is required for plants, and a single formal
claim must be used.43 Additionally, the United States Code "implicitly
recognizes there is no possibility of producing the plant from a disclosure as
35 U.S.C. § 112 contemplates." 44 "Therefore, there is no requirement for
any how-to-make disclosure in the application for a plant patent." 45 Plant
patents, like utility patents, also offer the same right to exclude others from
producing, offering for sale, or selling the plant for a period of twenty years
from the filing date of the application.4 6
B.

PLANT VARIETY AND PROTECTION ACT

In 1970, through the creation of the Plant Variety and Protection Act
(PVPA), Congress created patent-like protection for sexually reproduced
plants.4 7 The protection stems from the issuance of a certificate by the
Plant Variety Protection Office in the Department of Agriculture as
opposed to the issuance of a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office. 4 8
The current version of the PVPA extends protection to "any sexually
reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria),"49 but requires that the variety be "new," 50 "distinct," 51 "uniform," 52
and "stable." 53

40. Id.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 161.
42. See id. (providing that general patent provisions shall apply to plants unless otherwise
provided for in the plant patent provisions); 35 U.S.C. § 162 (indicating that the written
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 may be relaxed for plant patent applications).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 162; CHISUM, supra note 33, 1-1 § 1.05.
44. Application of LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
45. Id.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 163; CHISUM, supra note 33, 5-16 § 16.04[6].
47. CHISUM, supra, note 33, 1-1 § 1.05.
48. Id.; JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD C. REILEY III, & ROBERT C. HIGHLEY, 1
PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS, § 7.24, (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter MILLS, REILEY & HIGHLEY].

49. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2000); CHISUM, supra,note 33, 1-1 §1.05[21[a][ii].
50. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(1) (stating "new, in the sense that, on the date of filing of the
application for plant variety protection, propagating or harvested material of the variety has not
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While "[t]he certification standards of the PVPA are less rigorous than
the standards for utility ...

and plant patents," 54 the "new" and "distinct"

requirements are analytically similar to the statutory bar and noveltyanticipation concepts from patent law, respectively. 55 Further, similar to
plant protection via utility patents, a PVPA application must include a
description of the invention5 6 and a deposit of a viable sample necessary for
57
the plant's propagation.
The policy of the PVPA is also similar to the policy behind patent and
trade secret law: to provide an incentive for inventors to invest in their
inventions. 58 To serve this purpose, the PVPA creates rights for certificate
holders similar to those afforded patent holders. Like with patents, the
rights granted are not affirmative rights but rather the right to exclude others
from performing specific acts.59 Additionally, the PVP certificate provides
those rights only for a finite time period ending twenty years from the
certificate's issue date (except for trees and vines whose certificates expire
25 years from issuance). 60 However, at least one difference between PVP
certificates and utility patents is in the scope of protection provided. 6 1
While a utility patent may "claim multiple parts of [a] plant[], including
genomes coding for nonplant proteins, cells and cell cultures, plant tissue,
and wholly differentiated plants," a PVP certificate protects the entire plant
only, not including its individual parts. 62

been sold or otherwise disposed of to other persons"); see generally CHISUM, supra, note 33, 1-1
§1.05[2][a][iil (providing "new" requirement).
51. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(2) (stating "distinct, in the sense that the variety is clearly
distinguishable from any other variety the existence of which is publicly known or a matter of
common knowledge at the time of the filing of the application"); see generally CHISUM, supra,
note 33, 1-1 §1.05[2][a][ii] (providing "distinct" requirement).
52. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(3) (stating "uniform, in the sense that any variations are
describable, predictable, and commercially acceptable"); see generally CHISUM, supra, note 33, 11 §1.05[2][a][ii] (providing "uniform" requirement).
53. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402(4) (stating "stable, in the sense that the variety, when reproduced,
will remain unchanged with regard to the essential and distinctive characteristics of the variety
with a reasonable degree of reliability commensurate with that of varieties of the same category in
which the same breeding method is employed"); see generally CHISUM, supra, note 33, 1-1
§ 1.05[2][a][ii] (providing "stable" requirement).
54. CHISUM, supra, note 33, 1-1 §1.05[2][a][i].
55. Id. at §1.05[2][a][ii].
56. 7 U.S.C. § 2422(2) (2000).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 2422(4) (2000).
58. CHISUM, supra, note 33, 1-1 §1.05[2].
59. See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(1)-(10) (2000) (providing a list of ten acts constituting infringement when performed by someone other than the certificate owner and without the owner's
authority including selling, using, importing, and producing the protected variety).
60. CHiSUM, supra, note 33, 1-1 § 1.05[2][d][ii]; 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
61. MILLS, REILEY & HIGHLEY, supra, note 48.
62. CHISUM, supra, note 33, 1-1 § 1.0514].
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TRADE SECRETS

Unlike the federal patent laws, the power to create trade secret laws
was not vested in Congress by the Constitution, but instead was left to the
states.63 Despite the ability of each state to determine its own approach to
trade secret law, forty-two states have adopted some form of the Uniform
Trade Secret Act (UTSA).64 Thus, most states now use the UTSA's
definition of a trade secret. 65 The Restatement of Torts definition is also
widely used in case law, even among the states that have adopted the
UTSA.66 While the exact definition of trade secret varies, four fundamental
concepts must be present in any definition: (1) it must consist of qualifying
information; (2) it must be secret; (3) reasonable efforts must be made to
67
preserve secrecy; and, (4) the secret must give a competitive advantage.
Regardless of which definition is used, it is clear that "trade secrets
cover an enormous amount of information." 68 Unlike a patentable invention, a trade secret does not necessarily require novelty. 69 Negative trade
secrets may even be kept concerning efforts that have been discovered not
to work. 70 Unlike patents, trade secrets do not have a precise and universal
definition and, consequently they do not have the rigid requirements of a
patentable invention. 7 1 In fact, a patentable invention is but a subset of the
72
information covered by trade secret law.
63. Robert K. Hur, Takings, Trade Secrets, and Tobacco: Mountain or Molehill?, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 447,459 (November 2000).
64. See Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1633, 1657 (1998) (listing states who have enacted some version of the UTSA, including
North Dakota and Minnesota).
65. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4) (1985). The Act specifically provides:
"[tirade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not be
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id.
66. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939) provides: "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it."
67. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also 12 AM. JUR. POF 3d 711 § 4 (2004) (providing that information on failed
experiments may be a "negative" trade secret).
71. Compare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4) and POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01
(providing varying definitions for trade secrets) with 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103, 112 (providing rigid
requirements that must be satisfied).
72. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01.
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One of the main policies behind trade secret law, the encouragement of
invention, 73 is also a fundamental policy of patent law. 74 However, it is
important to note that the two requirements of secrecy and efforts to
preserve secrecy are fundamentally at odds with the patent law requirement
of disclosure. 75 This juxtaposition illustrates that while the policy of
promoting and encouraging invention is the same for both patent law and
trade secret law, the policy is furthered using radically different
approaches.

76

III. MULTIPLE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AVAILABLE FOR PLANTS
The courts have been willing to expand rather than curtail the extension
and overlap of intellectual property rights relating to plants.77 For example,
the Supreme Court has held that the creation of the PPA was not intended to
78
limit the scope of protection available to plants from a utility patent.
Similarly, the Court chose to allow concurrent protection of sexually
reproduced plants by holding that the PVPA does not limit an inventor from
obtaining utility patent protection for such plants. 79 Furthermore, the
Eighth Circuit, supported by Supreme Court cases, 80 refused to hold that the
PVPA preempts state trade secret law.81
A. PPA AND UTILITY PATENT OVERLAP
The subject matter protected by the PPA is distinct from that of the
PVPA and plant protection under utility patents. While the PVPA and

73. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (providing "[t]he
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the
broadly stated policies behind trade secret law"); POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.02[3].
74. See POOLEY, supra note 4, § 3.01[1][a] (providing that encouragement of invention is an
important aspect of patent law).
75. Compare POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.01 (providing definition of trade secret and listing
two elements as secrecy of the information and an effort to maintain the secrecy of the
information) with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (providing that the specification contain "full, clear, precise,
and exact terms" enabling a person of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention and that the
claims "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim the subject matter" regarded as the invention).
76. POOLEY, supra note 4, § 1.02[3].
77. See J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001) (providing that
the PVPA does not limit one's ability to obtain a utility patent).
78. Id. at 145.
79. Id.
80. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-87 (1974) (holding that trade
secret and patent protection can coexist); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 161 (1989) (stating that trade secret protection may "dovetail" with patent incentives).
81. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1242-43 (8th Cir.
1994).
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utility patent extend protection only to sexually reproduced plants, 82 the
PPA provides patent protection for asexually reproduced plants. 83
Therefore, the PPA overlaps with the rights provided by the PVPA or a
utility patent only to the extent that a plant may be reproduced using both
methods. 84 While the extent of this overlap is important, it is first important
to understand how the Supreme Court analyzed the treatment of the PPA in
its determination that a plant may receive patent protection from a utility
patent.
In J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 85 the
Supreme Court was unwilling to limit the available Section 10186 utility
patent protection and, therefore, refused to hold that the creation of the
PVPA provided the exclusive means for protecting sexually reproduced
plants. 87 In J.E.M., the petitioner purchased Pioneer's hybrid seed, which
was protected by a utility patent. 88 Petitioner, although not licensed, resold
those bags and a patent infringement suit was brought by Pioneer. 89
Rather than claim patent invalidity for failure to comply with the
PTO's requirements, the petitioner argued that the creation of the more
specific PPA and the PVPA statutes precluded plant patent coverage by
utility patents. 90 The petitioner provided "three reasons why the PPA
should preclude assigning utility patents for plants." 9 1 These reasons are as
follows: (1) prior to 1930, plants were not covered by utility patents,
otherwise there was no reason to pass the PPA in that year; (2) "the PPA's
limitation to asexually reproduced plants would make no sense if Congress
intended Section 101 to authorize patents on plant varieties that were
sexually reproduced"; and, (3) the 1952 amendment to Section 101 would
not have moved the plant subject matter language to Section 161 if Section
101 was still intended to cover plants. 92

82. 7 U.S.C. 2402(a) (2000); J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 127.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
84. See, Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1797, 1799
(1999) (stating that sexually reproducing plants may be protected by the PVPA, general utility
patents, the Plant Patent Act, as well as be common law trade secret protection); see GREENLIEF,
supra note 28 (stating that plants capable of sexual reproduction are not excluded from PPA
protection as long as they have also been asexually reproduced).
85. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
87. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 138.
88. Id. at 128.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 129.
91. Id. at 133.
92. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 534 U.S. 124, 134, 137 (2001).
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The majority disagreed with all of the petitioner's arguments. 93 The
first argument was rejected because the Court stated the argument was
inconsistent with the broad language of the utility patent statute to preclude
utility patent coverage for plants simply because it was unforeseen in 1930
that the allowable subject matter of Section 101 would later be interpreted
to include sexually reproduced plants. 94 The petitioner's second argument
was also dismissed after the majority considered that the then-current
technology showed asexual reproduction of plants to be the only "stable
way to maintain desirable bred [sic] characteristics." 95 Therefore, it would
have made sense to create patent protection for the technology pertinent at
the time. 96
Finally, the third argument was also quickly dismissed because the
Court found that Congress had not demonstrated an express intent to make
Section 161 the exclusive method of patenting plants. 97 This was supported
by the fact that the 1952 amendment did not change the rights or requirements associated with a plant patent, but merely moved the plant patent
language to its own section. 98 Thus, the Court determined that utility
patents were not precluded from plant protection, and thereby allowed dual
protection where the requirements of both the PPA and utility patent are
satisfied. 99
B.

PVPA AND UTILITY PATENT OVERLAP

The petitioner in J.E.M. also advanced three unsuccessful arguments to
contend that the PVPA displaced utility patent protection of plants: (1) that
the creation of the PVPA itself "evidences Congress' intent to deny broader
utility patent protection for such plants";100 (2) that the PVPA impliedly
altered utility patent subject matter; 10 1 and (3) that 'dual protection' from
overlapping statutes cannot exist "to protect the same commercially
valuable thing." 102
The petitioner relied on legislative history to support the argument that
the PVPA provides the exclusive means for protection of plant subject

93. Id. at 138.
94. Id. at 135.
95. Id.
96. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 534 U.S. 124, 136 (2001).
97. Id. at 137-38.
98. Id. at 138.
99. Id. at 133.
100. Id. at 138.
101. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
102. Id. at 144.
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matter.103 However, because the statutory language of the PVPA itself does
not contain a statement indicating that it was to provide exclusive protection
104
for plants, the Court quickly dispensed with this argument.
The petitioner's second argument, that the PVPA impliedly altered the
subject matter protected by utility patents, was also dismissed because the
Court found no irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes. 105 The
Court noted that it is easier to obtain a PVP certificate because it is not
necessary to show usefulness or nonobviousness.106 Furthermore, because a
PVP certificate is less difficult to obtain than a utility patent, the certificate
holder has fewer protected rights.107 Therefore, because each statute had
different requirements and provided different rights, the Court held that
each was effective. 108
Finally, the petitioner's third argument, that overlapping statutes cannot
exist to protect the same intellectual property, was likewise dismissed based
on the Court's longstanding recognition that two overlapping statutes are
valid and given effect "so long as each reaches some distinct cases." 109 As
a result, the Court ultimately held that the PVPA does not preclude utility
patent protection for plants, and further provided that they may exist
concurrently. 110
C.

OVERLAP BETWEEN TRADE SECRETS AND FEDERAL
REGULATIONS FOR PLANTS

The Eighth Circuit in Pioneer Hi-Bred International v. Holden
Foundation SeedsItt held that state trade secret law is not preempted by the
federally created PVPA.I"2 In so holding, the court noted a lack of express
congressional intent to preempt the state law.13 In that case, Pioneer sued
Holden claiming that Holden had misappropriated a specific genetic

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 144.
106. J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
107. See id. at 143 (noting that "PVPA protection still falls short of a utility patent, however,
because a breeder can use a plant that is protected by a PVP certificate to 'develop' a new inbred
line while he cannot use a plant patented under § 101 for such a purpose").
108. Id. at 144.
109. Id. at 144; see also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)
(stating that statutes that overlap "do not pose an either-or proposition" where "each section
confers jurisdiction over cases that the other section does not reach").
110. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 143. "Nor can it be said that the [PVPA and patent]
statutes 'cannot mutually coexist."' Id.
111. 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994).
112. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 35 F.3d at 1243.
113. Id.
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message from a hybrid corn seed. 114 On top of Holden's arguments that
Pioneer failed to satisfy the requirements of a trade secret, 1 5 Holden argued
that the PVPA preempts the state trade secret claim and thus Pioneer should
not have had a cause of action.11 6 The court held that the corn seeds were
trade secrets despite the availability of the corn to purchasers.1 1 7 Furthermore, the court held that the existence of the federally created PVPA does
not preclude sexually produced plants that would otherwise qualify for
coverage under the PVPA from being protected under state trade secret
law.''

8

In a similar case, a defendant to a trade secret action urged the district
court to distinguish Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l and find that a pineapple could
not constitute a trade secret because it was capable of asexual reproduction. 119 The court refused to do so, stating that there was "no legal or
logical basis for such a distinction." 120 Thus, trade secret protection extends
to both asexually and sexually reproduced plants. 121
While these cases do not expressly state that the PVPA and trade secret
law may operate concurrently to protect a plant variety, it is a small, logical
step to arrive at that conclusion. Because "the protection offered by trade
secret law may 'dovetail' with the incentives created by the federal patent
monopoly," 122 and because the PVPA offers patent like protection and
incentives, it follows that trade secret law may "dovetail" with PVPA
protection. This overlap between patents and trade secrets will be explored
further in the next section.
IV. OVERLAP BETWEEN PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS
While the ability of patents and trade secrets to coexist is no longer in
doubt, there is a lack of authority detailing the extent to which the two

114. Id. at 1229.
115. See id. at 1235-39 (arguing unsuccessfully that Pioneer failed to maintain the secrecy of
the genetic message and failed to demonstrate misappropriation of the genetic message).
116. Id. at 1242.
117. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds Inc., 35 F.3d at 1236, 1241 (8th Cir.
1994). While seed might have been available at an elevator, there would not have been an easy
way to identify the desired hybrid seed. Id. at 1236. The greater the cost, difficulty, and required
time to develop the information, the less likely that the information is "readily" ascertainable, and
the more likely that it is appropriate subject matter for a trade secret. Id.
118. Id. at 1243.
119. Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1292 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
120. Id.
121. Id.; PioneerHi-Bred Int'l v. Holden FoundationSeeds Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1242-43 (8th
Cir. 1994).
122. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989).
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methods of intellectual property protection may overlap.1 23 This section
will provide a background of the Supreme Court case law on the coexistence of the two intellectual property rights, and summarize the open-ended
way the court has described the overlap. Finally, an analysis will demonstrate the possible areas of overlap.
A. BACKGROUND

In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,124 and Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 125 the Supreme Court indicated a hard line rule that
federal patent law must preempt state law.126 However, the Supreme Court
in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,127 altered its treatment of the patent
and trade secret overlap and forcefully stated that "[tirade secret law and
patent law have co-existed in this country for over one hundred years. Each
has its particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take away
from the need for the other."' 28 In its opinion, the Kewanee Court noted
that patents and trade secrets had similar policy objectives, most importantly the encouragement of invention. 129 The Court went on to examine
the interactions between patent law and trade secret law to attempt to determine what level of encroachment was too much.130 The Court noted that
the patent policy of disclosure conflicted with the trade secret requirement
of secrecy, but then attempted to reconcile the two policies.' 3' In doing so,
the Court examined three different categories of trade secrets: "(1) the trade
secret believed by its owner to constitute a validly patentable invention; (2)
the trade secret known to its owner not to be so patentable; and (3) the trade
secret whose valid patentability is considered dubious."1 32
The first two categories were determined to further the patent policy of
disclosure by encouraging invention where patents provide no protection,
and allowing the dissemination of trade secret protected licenses when the
inventor is unwilling to take the risk that he has a patentable invention,

123. Id.
124. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
125. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
126. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33 (holding that state law could not prevent the copying of
an unpatented item); Compco, 376 U.S. at 237 (reiterating its holding in Sears, the Court stated
"when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy
that article").
127. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
128. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493.
129. Id. at 480-81.
130. Id. at 482.
131. Id. at 484.
132. Id. at 484 (citing Painton & Co. v. Boums, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 (C.A.N.Y. 1971)).
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respectively. 133 The third category was reconciled with patent law based on
the idea that trade secret law provides weaker protection than patent
laws. 134 Therefore, the Court came to the conclusion that "[s]tates should
be free to grant protection to trade secrets" even for material capable of
being patented. 135

In Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,136 the Court invalidated a state statute that banned the reproduction of boat hulls from a direct
molding process because the law prohibited the public from reverseengineering a product that was already in the public domain.137 The Bonito
Boats Court reaffirmed the implicit decision of Sears and Compco, "that all
state regulation of potentially patentable but unpatented subject matter is
not ispo facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws."1 38 Thus the Court
acknowledged the Kewanee decision139 while scaling back the broad
reading of Sears.140 Further, the Court tentatively indicated that trade secret
law may, to a certain extent, "dovetail" with patent law during the developmental stages of the product. 141
It is clear from these cases that federal patent law does not preempt
state trade secret law. However, the courts have not given a clear indication
of the allowable extent of overlap. 142 At best, the Bonito Boats Court stated
that some amount of overlap may be possible; however, the Court also
indicated that this overlap would likely only be possible at the developmental stage of the invention. 143

133. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485, 488 (1974).
134. See id. at 489-90 (noting that patent law acts as a barrier to independent inventors where
as trade secret law acts like a sieve and therefore an inventor is unlikely to rely on trade secret
protection where patent protection is available).
135. Id. at 493.
136. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
137. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160.
138. Id. at 154.
139. See id. at 155 (stating that the court made the implicit holding of Sears explicit in
Kewanee).
140. See id. at 154 (stating "[t]hat [the] broad pre-emptive principle from Sears is
inappropriate").
141. Id. at 161.
142. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989)
(providing that, "to a certain extent, the protection offered by trade secret law may 'dovetail"'
with a patent's incentives, but not providing for the extent of the overlap).
143. Id.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

B.

[VOL. 81:171

UNEXPLORED AREAS OF OVERLAP

The slight indication of a possible overlap provided in Bonito Boats
does not fully encompass the range of overlap available for utilization.'4
Even at the production and early patent application stages, extra measures
must be taken to preserve an invention's secret status.14 5 Furthermore, it
may be possible to obtain dual protection of intellectual property through
both a patent and a trade secret at more than just the developmental stage of
an invention. 146
While it is still possible to retain a trade secret on a product during the
patent application process, current patent laws mandate that a patent
application be published eighteen months after its filing date.14 7 Thereafter,
any information included in the patent application will be available to the
public. 148 However, there are exceptions to the eighteen month publication
rule. 149 Of these exceptions, the ability to file a nonpublication request,
would allow for the inventor to maintain an invention's trade secret
status. 150 In exchange for the nonpublication grant, the invention must not
have been published and will not be published in a foreign application or
other application that requires mandatory publication. 15 1 Thus, if the
inventor is willing to sacrifice his ability to obtain a foreign patent, he may
maintain the secrecy of his invention up to publication of the patent or, until
the secret is otherwise revealed if the patent is not issued.152

144. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(indicating that a method of practicing an invention need not be disclosed under the best mode
requirement if it was not the preferred method of the inventor, and therefore may be maintained as
a trade secret); In re Hayes Microcomputer Products Patent Litig., 982 F.2d 1527, 1536 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (indicating that a disclosure sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement may
still be maintained as a trade secret).
145. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (providing conditions for patentability including that the
invention not be in use or on sale more than one year prior to date of application for patent).
146. See e.g. Transco Prod. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc. 38 F.3d 551, 557-59 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (indicating that the best mode disclosure need not be updated when filing a continuing
application thereby allowing for the maintenance of trade secrets after the initial development of
the invention).
147. 37 C.F.R. § 1.211(a) (2004).
148. Id.
149. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.21 l(a)(l)-(4) (stating that an application, other than a provisional or
design patent application, shall be published after the expiration of eighteen months from the
filing date unless: (1) the application is no longer pending; (2) the application pertains to national
security; (3) the patent application has issued as a patent; and (4) the application included a
nonpublication request in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.213(a)).
150. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.213(a) (providing the circumstances under which a non-publication
request will be granted).
151. Id.
152. R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 3:63 (4th ed. 2004).
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This is not the only area where patent and trade secret laws may coexist
and provide mutually advantageous protection for an inventor. Other areas
of overlap between patent law and trade secret law involve the best mode
requirement and the written description requirement. 153
1.

Best Mode Overlap

The best mode requirement involves a two-part inquiry.154 The first is
a subjective determination assessing whether the inventor possessed the
best mode for practicing the invention at the time he applied for the
patent.155 The second inquiry is objective and, if the inventor possessed the
best mode, determines if the written description sufficiently disclosed the
best mode to allow a person reasonably skilled in the art to practice the
invention.156
The subjective best mode requirement requires that an inventor
disclose only what he believes to be the best mode at the time of filing the
application.157 Thus, a patent owner only has to reveal the best mode that
he is aware of and may maintain any other methods of practicing the
invention not claimed in the patent as a trade secret. 158 Furthermore, the
inventor has to disclose the best mode he knew of at the time of application,
but has no continuing duty to update the best mode disclosure.15 9 This
allows an inventor to maintain trade secret protection for any postapplication discoveries of a better mode for practicing the invention.160

153. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(indicating that the best mode requirement does not require more than the preferred method of the
inventor, and therefore a nonpreferred method may be maintained as a trade secret); In re Hayes,
982 F.2d at 1536 (indicating that a disclosure sufficient to satisfy the written description
requirement may still be maintained as a trade secret).
154. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Engel Indus., 946 F.2d at 1532-33 (stating that an inventor did not have to disclose
a crimping method for fastening duct segments together when the inventor's preferred mode was
to snap the comers in without a fastening device).
158. See id. (indicating that since nonpreferred method of practicing the invention did not
have to be disclosed, it could be maintained as a trade secret).
159. See Transco Prod. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc. 38 F.3d 551, 557-59 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding that an inventor does not have to update the best mode disclosure in a continuing
application); cf Applied Materials Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Inc., 98 F.3d 1563,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating "[i]nventors must update their best mode disclosure when filing a
continuation-in-part which adds new matter pertinent to the best mode of practicing the invention
claimed in the continuation-in-part").
160. Transco, 38 F.3d at 557-59.
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Furthermore, the objective best mode inquiry does not require
disclosure of production details or manufacturing procedures. 16 1 Courts
recognize two forms of "production details."162 The first form is that of
"true" production details, relating to commercial considerations such as
equipment and relationships with suppliers, not to the nature of the invention. 163 The second form refers to routine details related to the nature of the
invention, but that a person of ordinary skill in the art would know. 164
Those details do not need to be disclosed to satisfy the objective best mode
inquiry because a person of ordinary skill in the art commonly knows
routine details.165 Additionally, because those in the field of the invention
commonly know routine details, they would not properly be the subject
matter of a trade secret. 166 However, under the broad definition of trade
secrets, the equipment used to produce the invention and the business
relationships associated with the invention may be appropriate trade secret
subject matter. 167
As mentioned previously, the inventor only has to disclose the best
mode of practicing the invention that the inventor was aware of at the time
of application. 168 Thus, another exploitable overlap occurs when another
party to the application, such as the inventor's employer is aware of a better
mode.169 In Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.,170 the inventor of a drug tablet
was unaware of an improved process for commercially producing tablets.171
Others at the inventor's company were aware of the improved process, but
did not disclose the information to the inventor. 172 The Glaxo court held
that there was no best mode violation because the inventor did not have
actual knowledge of the best mode known by his employer. 173 Not only

161. See id. at 560 (providing best mode requirement does not require the disclosure of
production details as long as the enablement requirement is satisfied).
162. Young Dental Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Q3 Special Products, Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1144 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Products Inc., 94 F.3d 1569, 1572, (Fed.Cir. 1996).
163. Young Dental, 112 F.3d at 1144.
164. Id.; Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
165. Young Dental, 112 F.3d at 1144.
166. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). "Matters of public knowledge or of
general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret." Id.
167. Id. "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." Id.
168. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d 963; Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1050 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (emphasis added).
169. Glaxo, 52 F.3d at 1051-52.
170. 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
171. Glaxo, 52 F.3d at 1050.
172. Id. at 1051.
173. Id. at 1052.
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was the court unwilling to impute the employer's best mode knowledge to
the inventor, but the court also indicated in dicta that it was unwilling to
find a best mode violation where an employer screens an inventor from
174
research to prevent the inventor's knowledge of the best mode.
In Glaxo, it could be argued that the employer simply made the
decision to protect the tablet making process with a trade secret instead of a
patent. However, this does not detract from the overlap.175 In a different
situation, the newly discovered best mode for practicing the invention,
discovered after the initial application, may not rise to the level of a patentable improvement appropriate for a separate patent. 176 If the undisclosed
best mode is not patentable, the utilization of trade secret rights will overlap
with the patent through the developmental stage and could possibly extend
beyond the life of the patent. 177
2.

Written Description Overlap

The first paragraph of Section 112 in part requires that "[t]he
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains...
to make and use the same .
-178 While the written description does not
have to describe the exact subject matter claimed, it must allow persons of

174. Id. In dicta, the court stated:
Separating scenarios in which employers unintentionally isolate inventors from
relevant research from instances in which employers deliberately set out to screen
inventors from research, and finding a best mode violation in the latter case, would
ignore the very words of § 112, first paragraph, and the case law as it has developed,
which consistently has analyzed the best mode requirement in terms of knowledge of
and concealment by the inventor. Congress was aware of the differences between
inventors and assignees, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(d) and 152, and it specifically limited
the best mode required to that contemplated by the inventor. We have no authority to
extend the requirement beyond the limits set by Congress.
Id.
175. See id. at 1051-52 (indicating that an employer's knowledge will not be imputed to the
inventor and therefore the employer may maintain a trade secret pertaining to the invention as
long as the inventor is unaware).
176. See Transco Prod. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc. 38 F. 3d 551, 558-59 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding that even if the newly discovered best mode was patentable, the best mode would
not have to be updated in a continuing application).
177. See, Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 517 F. Supp. 52, 61 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (stating that, to
the extent that trade secret protection does not encroach on federal patent protection, the legal
viability of a trade secret may survive the expiration of patent).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (emphasis added).
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ordinary skill in the art to determine that the inventor was in possession of
the invention at the time of filing. 179
In In re Hayes Microcomputer Products Patent Litig.,180 the defendant
in a patent infringement suit argued that the patent at issue was invalid for
failure to meet the written description requirement because a "timing
means" was maintained as a trade secret. 181 The specification described a
software flowchart, and sufficiently recited the function of the item
maintained as a trade secret. 182 The court held that the written description
requirement was satisfied because one skilled in the art would understand
18 3
what was intended by the function and know how to carry it out.
As this case illustrates, the courts are willing to allow the complementary overlap of patents and trade secrets, as long as the state law does
not directly conflict with federal law, and the federal requirements are
satisfied.184 However, is this the only limitation on the overlap between
patents and trade secrets, and if so, is that enough?
V. LIMITATIONS ON DUAL AND MULTIPLE PROTECTION
While the courts have repeatedly agreed that overlapping intellectual
property rights are allowable, the courts have yet to establish limits on the
overlap.t 85 This raises the following: Are the limits inherent in each of the
respective rights created and therefore no external limitations are required?186 In other words, is one form of intellectual property right merely
allowed to serve as a complement to another form of intellectual property
right so long as the rights do not conflict?I8 7 If so, is this in-line with the
policies behind the respective intellectual property rights?

179. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted) (stating "[a]lthough [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly the subject matter
claimed,... the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that
[he or she] invented what is claimed").
180. 982 F.2d at 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
181. In re Hayes, 982 F.2d at 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
182. Id. at 1534.
183. Id.

184. See id. (upholding validity of patent because the written description requirement was
satisfied despite the failure to disclose a trade secret).
185. See J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 141 (2001) (holding
that PVP certificates and patents may overlap but providing no limits on the extent of overlap);
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989) (providing that patents
and trade secrets may "dovetail" but not providing any limitations on the extent of overlap).
186. See Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 517 F. Supp. 52, 61 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (indicating that
patent law preempts trade secret law as long as the nature of the trade secret does not impinge
upon patent law).
187. Id.
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A. LIMITATIONS ON THE PLANT PATENT AND UTILITY PATENT
OVERLAP

While the Supreme Court in J.E.M. acknowledged that the plant patent
statutes did not preclude utility patents from being issued for plants, the
Court did not identify any limitation on the overlap.t 88 However, it is
apparent that some limitations preventing multiple protection are inherent in
the statutes themselves.1 89 For example, two patents of identical scope may
not be obtained on the same invention. 190 However, if the scope of the
patents varies somewhat, a plant patent and a utility patent may be obtained
for the same plant variety as long as the requirements of both statutes are
met.191 While this hurdle alone may be difficult to overcome, even if a
plant variety satisfies the requirements under both statutory sections, a
patent examiner may issue a double patenting rejection.t 92 However, a nonstatutory double patenting rejection may be overcome by a filing a terminal
disclaimer. 193 A terminal disclaimer has the effect of allowing both patents
to be issued and enforceable so long as they are held by a common owner
and expire at the same time. 194 This prevents separate owners from enforcing the same patent right, and prevents an unjustified term extension by
allowing the same owner to obtain a second patent for an obvious variant of
the invention. 195
Thus, it appears that when the overlap occurs within one type of federal
regulation, for instance between the PPA and utility patents for plants, there
are sufficient limitations provided. 196 These limitations are judicially

188. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 141 (providing no indication of the extent of
overlap).
189. See Pitney-Bowes, 517 F. Supp. at 61 (indicating that patent law preempts trade secret
law as long as the nature of the trade secret does not impinge upon patent law).
190. See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894) (providing if two claimed
inventions are identical in scope, the proper rejection is under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because an
inventor is entitled to a single patent for his invention); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating "[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore .. ") (emphasis
added).
191. See MAGDALEN Y.C. GREENLIEF, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1601 (stating that inventions may be claimed under both the
utility patent statute and under the plant patent statute).
192. See id. (stating that a double patenting rejection may be issued for inventions claimed
under both the utility patent statute and under the plant patent statute).
193. Id. at §§ 1601, 804.02; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(c) (2004) (providing the requirements for
filing a terminal disclaimer).
194. 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(c)(3).
195. In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
196. See id. at 1431 (providing that a double-patenting rejection prevents patent right
extension beyond its statutory limit).
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created and include the double patenting rejection.197 Therefore, it seems
clear that federal statutes for each respective type of intellectual property
right has sufficient built-in limitations on overlap. 198
Based on the patent statutes and rules, it is clear that the overlap between a plant patent and a utility patent are well accounted for. However,
this is not the case for the overlap between the PVPA and the available
patents for plants. 199
B.

LIMITATIONS ON THE

PVPA AND PATENT OVERLAP

While the Supreme Court made clear that sexually reproduced plants
may be covered by both a PVP certificate and utility patent, the Court failed
to establish any limitations on this overlap. 200 The Court has indicated that
the overlap is universal and complete; where both statutes' requirements are
satisfied, both forms of protection may exist.201 This is probably best
explained by the analogous requirements between the two statutes, as well
as the different application requirements and rights provided. 202 The PVPA
requirements are also similar to the requirements to obtain a plant patent.
Like the two patent statutes, the PVPA has a provision that prevents
multiple PVP certificates from being issued on the same plant variety. 203
The analogous statute provides that "[i]f [two] or more applicants submit
applications on the same effective filing date for varieties that cannot be
clearly distinguished from one another ... the applicant who first complies
with all requirements of this Act shall be entitled to a certificate of plant
variety protection .... "204

197. 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(c).
198. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000) (requiring a plant be "new," "distinct," "uniform," and
"stable" to qualify for a PVP certificate); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (providing statutory bars for
inventions); 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (providing for the use of disclaimers to eliminate potential
overlap).
199. See J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001)
(indicating that the two statutes may overlap as long as each reaches some distinct cases, but not
discussing rules that limit the overlap).
200. Id.
201. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that
"utility patents are available to plants and seeds that meet the requirements of patentability,
independent of and in addition to rights under the PVPA") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
202. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 112 (2000) (requiring invention to be new, useful, novel, as
well as requiring a written description and deposit of seed); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2402, 2422 (2000)
(requiring invention to be new, distinct, have a description, and declaration that a deposit of seed
will be deposited in public repository).
203. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(b).
204. 7 U.S.C. §2402(b)(1).
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However, neither statute describes what should happen when an
inventor obtains both a PVP certificate and a patent. 205 This would allow
an inventor to obtain protection under both the PVPA and patent laws and
subsequently assign away one of those intellectual property rights. 206 Thus,
separate owners would be able to enforce the same intellectual property
right against an infringing third party. 207 The court has addressed this issue
in the patent law context, and the possibility of harassment prompted the
terminal disclaimer provision requiring termination of rights upon the
alienation of one of the patents. 208 This harassment by multiple assignees is
one problem that the double patenting rejection and terminal disclaimer
209
provisions are meant to prevent.
The other purpose of the obviousness-type double patenting rejection
and terminal disclaimer is to prevent an unjustified term extension for two
patents relating obvious variants of one invention.21 0 While it is possible
for rights provided by the PVPA to outlast rights from a patent to the same
plant variety,21 1 it seems clear that this is different than the unjustified term
extension the Court was worried about with regard to patents. 2 t 2 Because
the "requirements for, and coverage of, utility patents and PVP certificates"
are different, the Court in J.E.M. seemed unconcerned with the possibility
213
of dual protection and enforcement of these intellectual property rights.
In short, the owner of both a PVP certificate and a patent for the same plant
variety would not be receiving a term extension past the expiration of the
patent, but would merely be left with the lesser rights provided by the PVP
2
certificate. 14

205. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2404 (2000) (providing requirements for obtaining a PVP
certificate but not indicating a limitation on concurrent patent ownership); 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164
(2000) (providing requirements for grant of plant patent but not indicating any limitation on
concurrent PVP certificate ownership).
206. See In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (providing that ownership of
two different intellectual property rights by the same person may be divided by transfers and
assignments).
207. Id. at 945.
208. See id. at 944 (stating "[t]he possibility of multiple suits against an infringer by
assignees of related patents has long been recognized as one of the concerns behind the doctrine of
double patenting").
209. In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d at 947.
210. In re Berg, 140 F.3d at 1431-32.
211. See CHISUM, supra, note 33, 1-1 § 1.05[2][d][ii]; 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b)(I)(A)-(B) (2000)
(providing that the term for plant variety protection for trees and vines under the PVPA is twentyfive years); 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (2000) (providing that the term for a patent is twenty years).
212. See J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(indicating that because of the different requirements and levels of protection provided by patents
and PVP certificates, the concurrent protection of the same invention is allowable).
213. Id. at 142.
214. Id. at 144.
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When the overlap occurs between two distinct federal regulations such
as the PVPA and the patent statutes, the limitations on the concurrent use of
intellectual property rights are not as clear. 215 At least one limitation should
be created for when a PVP certificate and a patent protect the same plant
variety. This limitation should be similar to the double patenting rejection
utilized in patent law, thereby requiring the termination of the intellectual
property rights upon the separation of a commonly owned PVP certificate
and patent covering the same plant variety. 2 16 Absent this requirement, the
owner of a PVP certificate and a patent on the same plant variety may
assign the rights of one while maintaining the rights to the other.2 17 The
creation of this limitation would prevent the harassing situation where an
infringer would be liable to two separate entities. 218
C.

LIMITATIONS ON THE PATENT AND TRADE SECRET OVERLAP

Unlike the overlap between two patents covering the same invention,
the courts have not hesitated to give effect to complementary trade secrets
and patents. 219 Therefore, it can be reasoned that the inherent limitations on
the overlap between trade secrets and patents are sufficient to prevent the
exploitation of these intellectual property rights.220 These inherent limita-

tions may be illustrated by analyzing the possibility of a patent term extension through the use of a trade secret as well as the potential for harassment
by separate owners of each type of intellectual property right.
While it could be argued that the use of trade secrets to complement
patents is impermissible because the trade secret prevents full disclosure of
the invention and could extend the intellectual property right beyond the
term of the patent, this is not true. 22 1 The claimed subject matter of the
patent will enter the public domain at the expiration of the patent, and with
215. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (demonstrating
the lack of clarity through the dispute that the PVPA right to save protected seeds is not extended
to patent holders).
216. See In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (illustrating the potential for
harassment if multiple intellectual property rights are granted to one owner and one is
subsequently transferred or assigned).
217. See id. at 945 (providing that absent a double patenting rejection, a holder of multiple
patent rights may assign one patent right and maintain the other).
218. Id.
219. See In re Hayes, 982 F.2d 1527, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (indicating that a patent may be
granted despite the disclosure of a structure in the written description that is maintained as a trade
secret).
220. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1974) (stating that trade
secret and patent protection can "peacefully coexist" and thereby indicating the sufficiency of
inherent limitations).
221. See MILLS, REILEY & HIGHLEY , supra note 48, § 4:25 (providing that information may
be maintained as a trade secret as long as it is not necessary to fulfill patent law requirements).
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that expiration also passes the right to exclude.2 22 The trade secret subject
matter is independent from and mutually exclusive to the patent subject
matter. 223 Therefore, only the protection of the trade secret material continues, but the protection of the patented material does not.224 While the
trade secret rights may continue, the public has the opportunity to utilize the
previously patented information and reverse-engineer the trade secrets. 225
Additionally, where one of the property rights is a trade secret, the
potential for third party harassment from multiple owners of intellectual
property rights covering the same invention is non-existent. 226 Unlike with
the overlap between the PVPA and patents, or between utility patents and
plant patents, a trade secret can only cover a variation of the patented
invention. 227 If an invention is disclosed in a patent application, it is available to the public and cannot be a secret-therefore, any accompanying
trade secret must be complementary.2 28 In short, as long as the patent
requirements are satisfied, trade secrets may be used to complement the
patent protection without the fear of improper term extensions or the
harassment from multiple redundant lawsuits. 229
D.

LIMITATIONS ON THE

PVPA AND TRADE

SECRET OVERLAP

Similar to the judicial acceptance of overlap between patents and trade
secrets, the courts have also been willing to recognize concurrent protection

222. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
223. See Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 517 F. Supp. 52, 61 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (stating that trade
secret protection that is separate and distinct from federal law may have a "separate legal
viability" that "might survive the expiration of a patent").
224. Id.
225. See Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (providing that the
rights afforded by a patent no longer exist after the patent term expires).
226. MILLS, REILEY & HIGHLEY, supra note 48, § 4:25 (emphasis added) (providing that
information not disclosed in a patent as well as improvements may constitute a separate
invention).
227. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (providing that the claim shall "particularly [point] out and
distinctly [claim] the subject matter" regarded as the invention); MAGDALEN Y. C. GREENLIEF,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2171(A)(B) (2004) (providing that the claims define the metes and bounds of the invention, therefore only
what is claimed is protected).
228. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000) (providing that patent applications shall be published after
eighteen months from their filing date, subject to certain exceptions).
229. See MILLS, REILEY & HIGHLEY, supra note 48, § 4:25 (providing that information may
be maintained as a trade secret as long as it is not necessary to fulfill patent law requirements);
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found., 35 F.3d 1226, 1236, 1242 (8th Cir. 1994) (providing that
the PVPA does not preempt trade secret law and that public availability of seed does not negate
trade secret status as long as measures were taken to preserve the secrecy of the invention).
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of intellectual property through both a trade secret and a PVP certificate. 230
At least one court bolstered that recognition with the fact that the Supreme
Court already held that patent and trade secret protection can "peacefully
coexist."

231

Unlike a patent application, an application for a PVP certificate is
maintained as confidential.232 Although the application for a PVP certificate must contain a description of the novel plant, 233 the plant itself may
still be maintained as a trade secret thereby allowing concurrent PVPA and
trade secret protection. 234 Unlike trade secrets and patents operating in
tandem, trade secret law may provide concurrent protection along with PVP
certificates; protection in addition to that provided by the PVP certificate.2 35
As a result, it is possible for one person to have PVPA protection and trade
236
secret protection for the same idea or information.
Thus, any third person infringing upon a PVP certificate and a trade
secret would be liable for two separate causes of action. 237 This could potentially lead to third party harassment by multiple assignees similar to
harassment avoided by the terminal disclaimer in the patent system. 238
Despite the potential for harassment, the courts have remained unconcerned
239
with the overlap.

230. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 35 F.3d at 1235-36 (providing that genetic makeup of seed
protected by PVP certificate was also protected by trade secret law despite public availability of
the seed).
231. Id. at 1243 (internal citation omitted).
232. 7 U.S.C. § 2426 (2000).
233. 7 U.S.C. § 2422 (2000).
234. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, 35 F.3d at 1236 (providing that genetic makeup of seed
protected by PVP certificate was also protected by trade secret law despite public availability of
the seed).
235. See id. at 1236, 1242 (providing that the PVPA does not preempt trade secret law and
that public availability of seed does not negate trade secret status as long as measures were taken
to preserve the secrecy of the invention).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1242-43.
238. See In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (providing that ownership of
two intellectual property rights may be transferred or assigned which could result in multiple suits
against an infringer).
239. See id. at 1243 (holding that the PVPA did not preempt state trade secret law); see also
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001) (providing that patent
policy is not disturbed by trade secrets as a form of incentive to invention and further noting that
the PVPA provides a lesser form of patent-like protection where the stricter patent requirements
cannot be met).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The single pervasive policy concern throughout all of the intellectual
property rights discussed is to create an incentive for inventors to invent.240
New invention helps to grow the economy and push the boundaries of
technology. 241 Despite the conflict between the patent and PVPA policy of
disclosure and the trade secret policy of secrecy, all three intellectual
property rights serve this greater policy interest.242 As a result, it follows
that the existence and use of multiple protection also furthers the policy
goal by obtaining the benefits available from all three types of
protection-essentially providing the best of all types.
Based on the existing case law, it is apparent that no external limits on
dual protection currently exist. 243 The lack of limits on dual protection is
very important to companies seeking to protect their intellectual property
rights because it allows for the creation of a synergistic intellectual property
portfolio.244 In turn, it also creates different avenues to pursue potential
infringers. 245 In other words, if one type of intellectual property right is
invalidated, the owner may act to enforce another intellectual property right.
Based on the complementary nature of the intellectual property rights, and
the boundaries inherently created in each, external limitations are often not
required. 246 However, should the opportunity arise, a legislative or

240. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-482 (1974) (providing that the
Constitutional provision allowing Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts" is meant to create an incentive for inventors to invent and the encouragement of invention is
likewise a "broadly stated polic[y] behind trade secret law").
241. Id. at 480.
242. See id., at 480-82 (providing that the Constitutional provision allowing Congress to
"promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" is meant to create an incentive for inventors
to invent and the encouragement of invention is likewise a "broadly stated polic[y] behind trade
secret law"); see also J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001)
(noting that "the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of
another form of incentive to invention").
243. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 144 (providing that "dual protection" via patents and
the PVPA may exist so long as each statute "reaches some distinct cases"); see also Pioneer HiBred Int'l v. Holden Found., 35 F.3d 1226, 1242-43 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the PVPA does
not preempt state trade secret law as applied to sexually reproducing plants).
244. Katherine C. Spelman & John J. Moss, The Intellectual Property Inventory: Why Do It?
429 CONDUCTING INTELL. PROP. AUDITs 257 (Feb. 1996).
245. See e.g. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 144 (providing that "dual protection" via patents
and the PVPA may exist so long as each statute "reaches some distinct cases" thereby allowing
different methods to pursue infringer).
246. See id. (providing that "dual protection" via patents and the PVPA may exist as long as
each statute "reaches some distinct cases" without providing external limitations and thereby
indicating that inherent limitations were sufficient); see also Kewanee, 416 U.S. 480-82 (stating
that even partial preemption is inappropriate and that trade secrets and patents may coexist but
failing to provide limitations on the coexistence).
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judicially created limitation may be necessary for separate ownership of a
PVP certificate and patent covering the same plant variety.
JonathanD. Carpenter

